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MAIN PARACHUTE FAILURE 
The three  main parachutes of t h e  Apollo 15 spacecraft deployed a d  
inf la ted  properly a t  approximately 10 000 f e e t  a l t i tude .  Films show t h a t  
a l l  three parachutes disreefed and opened f u l l y  i n  t h e  proper sequence. 
The spacecraft and i t s  parachutes were. obscured by clouds a t  about 7000 
feet  a l t i tude .  Upon emerging from t h e  clouds at about 6000 fee t  a l t i tude ,  
one of the  three main parachutes w a s  deflated as shown i n  f igure 1. The 
spacecraft and parachute system descended i n  t h i s  configuration t o  water 
landing. The three  parachutes were disconnected and one of t h e  good main 
parachutes was recovered. The f a i l u r e  occurred abruptly. A t  about t h e  
a l t i tude  and time of t h e  f a i l u r e ,  t h e  forward heat sh ie ld  was i n  close 
proximity t o  the  spacecraft and the  reaction control system propellant 
depletion f i r i n g  was about completed. An inspectior1 of t h e  recovered 
parachute showed one of t h e  s i x  r i s e r  l inks  had a broken stud a ~ d  three  
others had cracks. The i n v e ~ t i g a t i o n  of t h e  f a i l u r e  was, therefore,  fo- 
cused on the  reaction control  system propellant depletian f i r i n g ,  t h e  
forward heat sh ie ld ,  and t h e  f a i l e d  l inks .  
DESCRIPTION AND SYSTEM OPERATION 
The ear th  landing system decelerates and s t ab i l i zes  t h e  command mod- 
ule t o  safe  conditions f o r  landing. The landing sequence is  i n i t i a t e d  a t  
a nominal a l t i tude  of 24 000 f e e t  with jet t isoning cf the  forward heat 
shield. Immediately a f t e r  separation of t h e  hect sk ie ld  from t h e  command 
module, a 7.2-foot-diameter parachute is  mortar-de~lloyed from the  forward 
heat shield. This parachute prevents i n i t i a l  reco~i tac t  between the  'neat 
shield and the  command module. 
Two 16.5-foot diameter conical ribbon-type drogue parachutes are mor- 
tar-deployed 1.6 seconds a f t e r  forward heat sh ie ld  . jet t ison.  The drogue 
parachutes are deployed i n  a reefed condition and, i O  seconds l a t e r ,  in- 
f l a t e  t o  the  fu l ly  open configuration. The drogue ~arachu tes  are  released 
from the command module a t  an a l t i tude  of abcut 11 300 f e e t .  A t  drogue 
parachute disconnect! three  7.2-foot diameter r*ingrslot p i l o t  parachutes 
are mortar-deployed. The p i l o t  parachutes provide the  force necessary t o  
release the  msin parachute retention system and p u l  the  main parachute 
pack assemblies froni t h e  upper deck. A s  t h e  main parachute packs are 
pulled away from the  command module, t h e  parachute:; are extracted from 
t h e i r  deployment bags. Each main parachute infl-:tes through two reefing 
stages t o  the  fu l ly  open configuration. The three  main parachute assem- 
b l i e s  ( f ig .  2 )  decelerate the  command module t o  the  f i n a l  descent velocity.  
E ~ s h  niain parachute canopy consists  of twelv,? rings of s a i l s  with 
each ri . divided in to  68 gores. The canopy terminates i n  6 R  suspension 


l ines  which are  attached by s i x  s t e e l  connector l inks t o  s i x  individual 
legs of a fabr ic  r i s e r .  Tie s i x  legs of t h e  fabr ic  r i s c r  coverge in to  
a single leg  which connects t.c t h e  end of a s t e e l  cable r i s e r .  The three  
s t e e l  cable r i s e r s  of the  parachute system coverge and at tach t o  the  com- 
mand module through t h e  parachute attachment and disconnect assembly. 
A discussion of t h e  analysis ,  t e s t s ,  conclusions, an2 rlorrective 
actions are contained i n  t h i s  report.  A l l  times shorn i n  t5is report 
are elapsed time from range zero. Range zero is the  nearest in tegra l  
second pr ior  t o  l i f t -o f f .  
FLIGHT DATA 
Pertinent data and the  sequence of events are  shown i n  f igure  3. 
The data showed no abnormal conditions or  events p r io r  t o  t h e  fa i l -we .  
About 3.5 seconds before t h e  f a i l u r e ,  the  reaction control  system man- 
i fo ld  pressure abruptly increased t o  a new leve l ,  indicat ing t h e  regula- 
t o r  had closed because a l l  t h e  oxidizer w a s  expelled from the  tanks. The 
fuel ,  however, was s t i l l  being expelled and was calculated t o  have been 
depleted about 4.7 seconds a f t e r  t h e  oxidizer depletion. This was based 
on a determination of about 7 pounds of fue l  remaining at oxidizer deple- 
t ion .  About 8 seconds a f t e r  the  fa i lu re ,  t h e  reaction control  system 
purge w a s  i n i t i a t e d  by t h e  crew.  he crew was unaware of t h e  f a i l u r e  
u n t i l  some time a f t e r  t h e  purge.) The time of t h e  purge i s  indicated i n  
figure 3 5y the  abrupt decrease i n  system pressure. 
The iorces act ing upon the  spacecraft a t  i h e  time the  parachute 
fa i l ed  were determined from body-mounted accelerometer data. The force 
vector change a t  the  parachute at tach point w a s :  
F = -1379 x + 356 Y + 886 pounds 
- - 
This resultant  vector locates t h e  f a i l e d  parachute as shorn i n  f ig-  
ure 4. The computed force vector was substantiated by body-mounted r a t e  
gyro data. 
PHOTOGRAPHIC DATA 
Figure 5 shows the  spacecraft and lower parachute system when the  
spacecraft was re la t ive ly  close t o  landing. The following observations 
resulted from study of t h i s  f igure and other photographic data. 





a .  Apparer.li2.y t h ree  of +lie s i x  l egs  of t h e  f s b r i c  r i s e r  were tak ing  
the  load. 
5. There w a s  no s i g n i f i c a n t  canopy damage observed. 
c. About two-thirds of t h e  suspension l i n e s  appewed t o  be  micsing. 
CREW OBSERVATIONS 
The Command Module Pilot, ,  while looking through t h e  left-hand rendez- 
vous window, witnessed t h e  j e t t i s o n i ~ g  of t h e  heat  s h i e l d  and t h e  deploy- 
ment of t he  drogue parac;~utes; both f'unctions appeared nominal. k few 
seconds a f t e r  drogue parachute r e l ea se ,  t h e  Command Module P i l o t  observed 
the  deployment of t h e  main parachutes i n  t h e  reefed  condition. The para- 
chutes m i n t a i n e d  t h e  reefed condit ion,  aft,er which d is reef ing  occurred, 
and all. th ree  parachutes i n f l a t e d  normally. Following t h i s  event ,  t h e  
crewmer. were performing various cockpit t a sks  which included t h e  reac t ion  
.on t ro l  system deplet ion f i r i n g .  Af te r  t h e  ccmpletion of t h e  fi i n g ,  t h e  
Command Module P i l o t  observed t h a t  t h e  parachute had f a i l e d .  A t  i h c  same 
t 'ne,  he not iced t h e  normal brown oxid izer  c!.oud Prom t h e  purge. Gther 
functions through landing were nominal except t h a t . t h e  landing was Sarder 
than normal, -- 
RECOVERY FORCES OBSERVATIONS 
-_ 
The p i l o t s  and copi lo ts  of t h r e e  of t h e  recovery he l i cop te r s  (swim 2 ,  
Photo, and ~ e l a y )  observed the spacecraf t  between main parachute opening 
and landing. The loca t ions  of t h e  recovery forces  at t h e  time of t h e  anon- 
a l y  a r e  shown i n  f i gu re  6. The observat ions,  o f  t h e  t h r e e  he l icopter  crews 
show t h a t  t h e  anomaly occurred at approximaLely 6000 f e e t  and t h a t  t h e  
forward heat s h i e l d  w a s  f a l l i n g  i n  close proximity t o  t h e  spacec ra f t ,  but 
s!.ightly out of plsne f r o m t h e  observer t s  viewpoint. The he l i cop te r  crews 
observed t h e  brownish clo?;.q and puffs  of white smoke which normally occur 
during t h e  reac t ion  cont ro l  system purge. 
The swimmers successfu l ly  recovered one of t h e  main parachutes and 
the  forward heat  sh i e ld ,  although t h e  forward heat  s h i e l d  parachute was 
subsequently l o s t  during t h e  recovery operations.  An experi2nced pa~.a- 
chut i s t  who was a member of t h e  recovery team s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  forward 
heat sh i e ld  parachute appeared t o  be i n  good condition, with no t e a r s  ic 
t he  c m o p j  nor broken shroud l i n e s .  

RECOVERED PAIZACHUTE INSPECTION 
The recovered main parachute which had not f a i l e d  was inspected and 
the  r e s u l t s  of t h e  inspec t ion  were: 
a. Nine consecutive suspension l i n e s  were cut  approxims;tely 19 f e e t  
above the  r iser /suspension-l ine connector l i n k .  Addit ional ly,  s m e  25 
f e e t  of l i n e  was missing from each of t h e  cut  suspension l i n e s .  ( ~ i n e s  
were cut by Kavy swimmers t o  f r e e  t h e  parachute from t h e  command module.) 
b .  Gore 11 of panel 9 had a t e a r  approximately 12 inches by 12 Ic- 
ches which did not appear t o  have been caused by s t r e s s  o r  fYict ion burn- 
ing,  bu t  probably occurred during r e t r i e v a l .  
c .  Gore 55 of panel 5 had an 8-inch hor izonta l  t e a r  which a l s o  ap- 
peared t o  be t h e  r e s u l t  of r e t r i eTra l  o r  p o s t f l i g h t  handling operat ions 
r a t h e r  than t h a t  of f l i g h t  damage. 
d. There were numerous small (1/16-inch t o  l /h-inch) holes  i n  t h e  
cmopy. ( ~ h e s e  were probably caused by p o s t f l i g h t  handling. 
e .  The p i l o t  parachute and r i s e r  were i n  exce l len t  condi t ion,  and 
the  main parachute deployment bag had only minimal (normal] damage. 
f .  The canopy w a s  s t a ined  with o i l  and grease. 
g . A broken r iser /suspension-l ine connector l i n k  was found zfter 
the  pro tec t ive  Dacron boot le  had been removed (fig. 71. 
h.  Evidence of high temperature was noted on t h e  Dacron r i s e r  pro? 
t e c t i v e  cover ( f i g .  8) and t h e  Dacron connector l i n k  boot ie .  
FORWARD HEAT SYIELD INSPECTION 
The overa l l  appearance of t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  was cons is ten t  
with t h a t  of the  foiward heat sh ie lds  previously recovered. The heat  
sh i e ld  was examined f o r  evidence of foreign mater ia l  and none was found. 
The following spec i f i c  po in ts  were noted: 
a. The leading edge s e a l  was not damaged. 
b. Parachute cable r i s e r  marks were present  on t h e  outs ide  of t h e  
forward heat sh ie ld .  These marks occurred as a r e s u l t  of t h e  normal for-  
ward heat  sh i e ld  parachute deployment. 


c .  The forwerd hea t  s h i e l d  mortar had f i r e d  and t h e  ramp had i t s  
normal scra tches .  One pyrotechnic connector was ben t ,  probably as e re- 
s u l t  of ground handling. 
d. The handra i l  had been severe ly  heated and approximately 7 inches 
of r a i l  was missing. This condition was caused by reent ry  heat ing.  
e. The minus Z s i d e  was s l i g h t l y  f l a t t ened  from impact with t h e  
water. 
f .  The l a - y z d s  and p ins  from t h e  forward heat s h i e l d  switch a p ~ o a r e d  
t o  be normal. 
g. The umbilicals appeared t o  be normal. 
h. A s l i c e  from t h e  base of t h e  ab la tor  (7 inches by 1.5 inches by 
0.75 inch)  on t h e  plus  Z s i d e  was missing, but t h e  room-temperature vu l -  
canizing s e a l  was undamaged. The damage t o  t h e  a b l a t o r  was probably 
caused by t h e  recovery operation. 
i. A l l  forward hea t  s h i e l d  t h r u s t e r s  appeared t o  have functioned 
normally from t h e  appearance of t h e  a r ea  surrounding t h e  p i s ton  rods. 
j . Approximately 50 inches of t h e  f a b r i c  parachute r i s e r  were s t i l l  
at tached t o  t h e  s t e e l  r i s e r .  The f a b r i c  port ion of t h e  forward heat  s h i e l d  
r i s e r  w a s  cut  by t h e  swimmers. 
FAILURE ASSESSMENT 
The inves t iga t ion  w a s  e s s e n t i a l l y  divided i n t o  t h r e e  areas  which 
were l i k e l y  suspects as t o  t h e  cause of t h e  parachute f a i l u r e .  
1. The forward heat s h i e l d  w a s  suspect because of t h e  c lose  prox- 
imity of t h e  heat  sh i e ld  t o  t h e  spacecraf i  f l i g h t  path during t h e  period 
when t h e  f a i l u r e  occurred. 
2 .  A broken r iser /suspension-l ine connector l i n k  was found on .the 
recovered parachute i nd ica t ing  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of broken l i n k s  i n  t h e  
f a i l e d  parachute. 
3. The command module reac t ion  cont ro l  system propel lant  deplet ion 
f i r i n g  had ju s t  been completed and f u e l  expulsion was i n  progress a t  t h e  
time of t he  f a i l u r e ,  ind ica t ing  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of damage from t h e  pro- 
pe l l an t s .  
The analyses and t e s t s  performed t o  i nves t iga t e  each p o s s i b i l i t y  
a re  presented i n  t he  following paragraphs. 
Forward Heat Shield 
Trajectory analysis.- A t r a j ec to ry  analysis w a s  performed using s i m -  
ulat ions t o  determine i f  t h e  forward heat sh ie ld  could have contacted the  
main parachu+es. The simulations were based on the  point-mass equations 
of motion, which used t h e  known mass and aerodynamic character is t ics  of 
the  forward heat sh ie ld  and spacecraft parachute systems and the  measured 
downrange and crossrange winds. 
The simulations and analysis showed t h a t ,  a t  approximately 150 sec- 
onds after the  24 000-foot a l t i t u d e  had been reached, the  spacecraft and 
forward heat sh ie ld  were a t  t h e  same a l t i tude  of about 5700 f e e t  with & 
miss dastance of approximately 150 fee t .  This correlates with observa- 
t ions  of t h e  recovery personnel. Further, t h e  analysis indicates t h a t ,  
a t  landing, the  spacecraft and t h e  forward heat sh ie ld  were about 850 f e e t  
apart .  This agrees with t h e  estimated separation distance of 900 fee t  on 
the  water. 
Since the  wind data were measured several  minutes before landing, 
some deviations were expected. A wind p r o f i l e  within the  expec-' %d devi- 
at ion of f 2  knots was constructed t o  determine i f  contact between t h e  
forwerd heat .shield and command module parachute system w a s  possible. 
Based on the  wind p rof i l e  t r a jec to ry  simultttions , the  forward heat 
sh ie ld  could have contacted t h e  spacecraft p a r a c ~ u t e  system a t  an a l t i t u d e  
near 6000 fee t .  The inaccuracies i n  the  measured data and t h e  simulations 
are such t h a t  it cannot be conclusively s t a t e d  t h a t  the  contact did o r  
did not occur. It can only be s t a t e d  t h a t ,  i n  all probabil i ty,  t h e  miss 
distance was small. 
Photographic ar,alysis.- A close examin~tion of the  te levis ion record 
of spacecraft descent on t h e  main parachdtes establishes t h a t  t h e  forward 
heat sh ie ld  was below t h e  spacecraft a t  t k e  time of the  fa i lu re .  Specif- 
i c a l l y ,  the forward heat sh ie ld  is  seen below t h e  spacecraft i n  frame 588 
( f i g .  9 )  a t  295:09:11:3, approximately 2 seconds before the anomaly occur- 
red. By corre la t ion  with frame 775, which shows the  parachute and forward 
heat sh ie ld  i n  the  same frame a t  295:09:17.5, and by di rec t  measurement 
of the  separation distance between the  two objects and measurement of t h e  
known parachute dimensions, t h e  v e r t i c a l  separat!.on distances between t h e  
forward heat sh ie ld  and t h e  spacecraft were 580 f e e t  fo r  frame 588 and 
1020 fee t  f o r  frame 775. 
The posi t ion of t h e  forward heat sh ie ld  re la t ive  t o  the  guidance- 
and-navigation-estimated t r a jec to ry  i s  shown i n  f igure 10. By extrapo- 
l a t ing  the forward heat sh ie ld  t ra jec tory ,  the  forward heat sh ie ld  would 
have intercepted the  spacecraft a t  295:09:03. This is 10.5 seconds be- 
fore the  spacccraft da ta  indicate the  anomaly occuryed. 
Television frame 588 
295:09:11 .3  elapsed time 
Direct measurement 
4.04 inches 
Television frame 775 
295:09:17.5 elapsed time 
\ 
\ 80 -7 units %140 ft 
(Direct measurement - 7.11 in .I 
Figure 9 .- Television frame and trajectory analysis. 

Assessment of probabi l i ty  of forward heat s h i e l d  contact ing space- 
c r a f t . -  An assessment of t h e  p robab i l i t y  of t:?d forward heat s h i e l d  con- 
t a c t i n g  t h e  spacecraf t  was made t o  determine t h e  hazard associated with 
contact .  Actual wind data  i n  t h e  form of frequency of occurrence of 
winds a s  a function of a l t i t u d e ,  k'ind ve loc i ty ,  and d i r ec t ion  were used 
as E. bas i s  f o r  t h e  study. Wind da t a  were applied t o  nominal t r a j e c t o r i e s  
of t h e  spacecraf t  and forward heat s h i e l d  i n  a p lanar  (2 dimensional) 
ana lys i s  which y ie lded  t h e  frequency of occurrence of s p e c i f i c  values of 
range separat ion between t h e  two bodies at in t e rcep t  a l t i t u d e .  Range 
separat ion values of l e s s  than 100 f e e t  between t h e  two vehicles  were 
considered contact .  The cumulative p robab i l i t y  of contact i s  0.093 per- 
cent .  This analysis  considered no t r a j e c t o r y  dispersions.  Subsequent 
refinement of t h e  planar  bnalysis t o  include e f f e c t s  of l z t e r a l  disper- 
s ion (due t o  t h e  moderate l i f t  of t h e  forward heat  s h i e l d  system and t h e  
spacecraf t  on t h e  drogue parachute) provided a method which i s  much l e s s  
s ens i t i ve  t o  va r i a t i on  i n  i n i t i a l  condi t ions,  p r inc ipa l ly  i n  f l i g h t  path 
angle.  The re f ined  ana lys is  a l s o  y i e lds  a contact p robab i l i t y  of about 
0.1 percent.  
The wind da ta  a r e  based on measurements during t h e  month of August 
over a 13-year per iod f o r  an a rea  near t h e  Apollo 1 5  recovery zone. Wind 
frequencies were concentrated i n  t h e  east-northeast and west-southwest di-  
rec t ions .  These winds, and winds +22-112 degrees from east-northeast and 
west-southwest, were used t o  provide a conservative planar  wind p r o f i l e  
which permitted t h e  ana lys is .  
The winds were used t o  modnlate poin t  mass, z e r o ~ l ~ f t  nominal t r a ~  
j ec to r i e s  of t h e  forward heat s h i e l d  and spacecraf t .  Charac ter i s t ics  of 
t h e  t r a j e c t o r i e s  a r e  shown i n  t a b l e  I. 
Forward heat  shield/parachute suspension system impact t e s t s . -  Drop 
t e s t s  were conducted t o  determine t h e  nature and extent  of t h e  damage t o  
t h e  main parachute suspension l i c e s  and f a b r i c  r i s e r s  when impacted by a 
forward heat s h i e l d  a t  simulated f l i g h t  con&tians.  I n  +.es?,s of t h e  par- 
achute components, t h e  r i s e r s  and assoc ia ted  I.ines were 'nswted a t  t h e  
f l i g h t  angle (38 degrees from v e r t i c a l ) ,  with thn ! f -cs ~ 3 r r z c t l y  fanned 
and pre-tensioned ( f i g .  11) . In  t h e  suspension lint ':?st, che forward 
heat  s h i e l d  impacted 5 f e e t  above t h e  connector lii&:.r:;, sz r ik ing  a l l  22 
of t he  l i n e s  used, breaking four ,  and damaging 10 c' ( f i g .  11). The 
room-temperature vulcanizing material. on the  forward heat s h i e l d  edge w a s  
cut and gouged where it struck the  suspension l i n e s .  
Two r i s e r  t e s t s  were made. I n  t h e  f i r s t ,  t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  
impacted 1-314 inches above t h e  f a b r i c  confluence po in t ,  and i n  the  sec- 
ond, t h e  forward heat  sh i e ld  impa.cted near t h e  center  of t h e  42-inch 
r i s e r  legs .  I n  both cases ,  t h e  forward heat sh i e ld  bounced o f f  without 
damaging the  r i s e r s .  However, t h e  room-temperature vul?anizing mater ia l  
on the  leadiilg edge of t he  forward heat s h i e l d  was gouged ( f i g .  1 2 ) .  
TABLE I. - COMMAND MODULE/FORWMD HEAT SHIELD TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS 
I n i t i a l  Conditions 
Forward heat  s h i e l d  j e t t i s o n  
. . . . . . . . . . .  Alt i tude ,  ft 23 300 
Fl ight  pa th  angle,  deg . . . . . .  -73.1 
2 Q-nanic pressure,  l b / f t  . . . . .  124 
. . . . . . .  Spacecraft weight, l b  1 2  810 
Forward Heat Shie ld  
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  Weight, l b  310 
2 D r a g a r e a , C D S , f t  . . . . . . . .  27.75 
L i f t  coe f f i c i en t ,  C L * * * * * * *  0 
Spacecraft  
Drag area ,  CDS ( ~ o m i n a l  h i s t o r y  f o r  twordrogue/ 
three-main-parachute operat ion 1 
Li f t  coe f f i c i en t ,  CL . . , . . . .  0 
Al t i tude  of i n i t i a t i o n  of main 
. . . .  parachute deployment, f t  10  700 
Forward Heat Shield In t e rcep t  
~ l t i t u d e ,  ft . . . . . . . . . . .  6 415 
Time from forward hea t  s h i e l d  
. . . . . . . . . .  j e t t i s o n ,  sec 135.2 
a No-trind range separat ion,  f t  . . . .  -755 
aspacecraft  downrange of forward hea t  sh ie ld .  
\ /PI TWO r i s e r s w ~ m p a c t  p int 
Figure 11.- Results of f \ ~ , . ~ a r d  heat sl~ieldisuspension system impact test. 

These t e s t s  showe5 tha t  the  Torward heat sh ie ld  contacting the  para- 
chute could damage some of the  s-*pension l ines ,  but would probably not 
cause a loss  of riser legs.  
Forwar5 heat shield/command module inpact tests .-  Using t h e  suspen- 
sion E n e l r i s e r  test setup, two addit ional  drop tests with t h e  forward 
heat shield imracting the-spacecraft were perf&med. I n  the  f i r s t  test, 
the forward heet sh ie ld  impacted t h e  spacecraft upper deck i n  t h e  minus 
Y and minus Z bays, causing very l i g h t  surface damage t o  the  spacecraft,  
but severe damage t c  t h e  forward heat shield. I n  t h e  second t e s t ,  t h e  
fcrward heat shiel-t! impacted the spacecraft near t h e  hatch, breaking t h e  
outer hatch window and gouging t h e  ablator .  Again, t h e  forward heat sh ie ld  
was severly damaged. 
Based or, the  impact t e s t s  and analysis ,  t h e  worst-case damage which 
could be expected would occur i f  'he forward heat. sh ie ld  :.mpacted t h e  
crew compartment heat shield window. There is a poss ib i l l ty  tkt both 
the  heat sh ie ld  window and inner vindow would be broken. 
Forward heat shield/parachute canopy test . -  A test i n  which a for- 
ward heat sh ie ld  w a s  drclpped onto a parachute was performed t o  assess t h e  
dsnage which.might r esu l t  t o  t h e  parachute canopy. To simulate the  in r  
f la ted  main parachute, a 95-foot diameter polyethylene balloon w a s  in- 
f l a t ed  t o  0.2-inch of water ( the  dynamic pressure during steady-state de- 
scent)  with t h e  parachute placed over t h e  balloon and t h e  suspension l i n e s  
weighted. By using a guide cable, t h e  forward heat sh ie ld  was guided t o  
impact the  parachute canopy. The impact produced cutt ing,  tear ing,  and 
burn-type damage. One parachute r a d i a l  seam was broken, another was cut ,  
and s i x  s a i l s  were damaged. If t h i s  type of damage had been experienced 
i n  f l i g h t ,  the  parachute probably would have remdned in f l a ted  providing 
a near-nominal drag effec t .  
Conclusions froni forward heat sh ie ld  investigations.- The forward 
heat shielri was  not t h e  cause of t h e  f a i l u r e c f ' t h e  main parachute based 
on two separate s e t s  of data. F i r s t ,  t h e  te levis ion tape shows the  for- 
w z d  heat sh ie ld  emerging from t h e  clouds approximately 3 seconds p r io r  
t o  the  anomaly. Second, t h e  resu l t s  of the  suspension l i n e  and r i s e r  im- 
pact t e s t s  with t h e  forward heat sh ie ld  show t h a t  substant ia l  damage t o  
the  room-temperature vulcanizing material on t h e  leading edge of the  for- 
ward heat sh ie ld  wauld have occurred had there been contact. The recovered 
forward heat sh ie ld  did not have t h i s  type of damage. There w a s  no evi- 
dence of heat sh ie ld  contact with the  parachcte. 
Both the  t ra jec tory  analysis and the  te levis ion and observer data 
show t.hat the f o r ~ a r d  heat sh ie ld  did come close t o  t h e  spacecraft.  The 
analysis predicts t h a t ,  fo r  future f l i g h t s ,  probability-of-contact is  less 
than 1 i n  1000. I11 addition, the  t e s t s  of the  forward heat sh ie ld  impact- 
ing the  suspensicn and r i s e r  l i n e s ,  t h e  spscecrar't, and the  canopy, indi- 
cate t h a t ,  should contact occur, the  result ing damage t'ould not be catas- 
trophic. Therefore, Sased on the  low probability of contact,  and the  
acceptable danage should t h e  heet sh ie ld  contact t h e  spacecraft and its 
parachute system, no correct ive action is  required. 
Riser/Suspension Line Connector Links 
One stud i n  E. connector l ink  assembly on t h e  Apollo 15 recovered para- 
chute fa i led .  The f a i l u r e  was caused by stre.;s corrosion cracking, hydro- 
gen embrittlement, o r  some unknown mechanism. S t ress  corrosion i s  a pos- 
s i b l e  cause because t h e  high-strength s t e e l  (4130) used i n  t h e  l i n k s  
is susceptible at high stress levels  t o  cracking i n  salt water. Hydrogen 
embrittlement is a poss ib i l i ty  because of the  suscep t ib i l i ty  of  the  high- 
strength s t e e l  t o  cracking from dissolved hydrogen. Ear l i e r  i n  the  Apollo 
program, studs which were not properly processed a f t e r  p la t ing  f a i l e d  be- 
cause of kvdrogen enibrittlement. 
Link testing.- Several t e s t s  were performed on the  connector l inks .  
Tht results are  discussed i n  t h e  following paragraphs: 
Sustained-load test: Two l i n k  assemblies were sus ta in  loaded i n  
tension, axia l ly  along t h e  studs,  t o  a s t r e s s  of 132 000 p s i  a t  t h e  minor 
diameter of t h e  stud threads. The t e s t  was t o  reveal t h e  presence of hy- 
drogen embrittled material ; however, t h e  t e s ted  l inks  had been exposed 
t o  salt water, and therefore,  t h i s  t e s t  w a s  not suff ic ient  t o  dist inguish 
between delayed f a i l u r e  from salt-water immersion o r  hydrogen. 
The first specimen f a i l e d  7.6 hours after loaa applicat ion,  The 
f rac ture  surface had approximately two-thirds of t h e  cross sec t ional  area 
a t  the  stud shoulder exposed t o  a corrosive environment (probably sea 
water) p r io r  t o  t h e  start bf t h e  test. 
The second l i n k  specimen f a i l e d  48.9 hours after load application. 
This specimen did  not have t h e  large  pre-corroded area observed on the  
f i r s t  specimen; however, approximately 10 percent of t h e  cross-section 
hbd corrosion present.  The sustained-load i n d ~ c e d ~ f r a c t u r e  area was duc- 
t i l e  on both specimens. 
Stress corrosion t e s t s :  Four studs ,from the  recovered parachute 
l inks ( l o t  U) were loaded t o  a stress of 152 000 p s i  i n  tension at t h e  
minimum section of t h e  studs. Three of these studs were notched, and 
the  fourth specimen was t e s ted  i n  the  or ig inal  configuration. A l l  four 
specimens survived 200 hours of sq~s ta ined  load i n  air. A f t e r  200 hours, 
sea  water was placed i n  contact with t h e  notched area of two of t h e  studs 
and the  load was maintained f o r  an additional 48 hours. The t h i r d  notched 
specimen remained i n  sustained load as a control specimen. Although t h e  
sides of the notches exposed t o  s a l t  water were highly corroded, no f a i l -  
ure occurred. The unnotched specimen was removed a f t e r  200 hours of sus- 
tained load i n  a i r  and inspected under 25-power magnification f o r  cracks 
and none were observed. This unnotched stud was then remounted i n  a l ink  
assembly, torqued t o  120 in-lb, which i s  twice specif icat ion l eve l ,  and 
?laced i n  see  water f o r  24 hours. The l inks  ar3 studs were then air Cried, 
disassembled, anil examined for  cracks. No cracks were found. 
Eight additiclnal studs were torqued t o  200 in-lb i n  order t o  simu- 
l a t e  the  e f fec t  of tolerance buildup of stresses a t  specif icat ion torque 
levels .  Two studs f a i l e d  during exposure t o  sea  water, thus confirming 
the  poss ib i l i ty  of generating salt-water-induced s t r e s s  corrosion crack- 
ing i f  the  parts  are  within drawing limits. 
Tensile t e s t s :  Two l o t  T studs, which had not been exposed t o  salt 
water, were placed under load as studs t o  a s t r e s s  l e v e l  of 112 000 p s i ,  
as  computed f o r  t h e  minor diameter of t h e  stud threads. This s t r e s s  was 
maintained for  200 hours i n  an a i r  environment. The s t r e s s  was maintained 
while sea  water was placed i n  contact with the  s t ressed threads. After  
48 hours, the  sea  water was allowed t o  dry and the  specimen was maintained 
under load fo r  an addit ional  24 hours. No cracks were found when t h e  speci r  
men was examined under 25-power magnification. Both specimens were then 
pulled t o  f a i l u r e  i n  tension,  a f t e r  exhibit ing yielding,  at 254 000 p s i  
(normal nctch strengthening fo r  t h i s  material].  No evidence of pre-ex- 
i s t i n g  flaws o r  corrosion was found on t h e  f rac ture  surface. 
A t o t a l  of t e n  studs (two each from: a pack l i f e  parachute, l o t  U 
tha t  had not been flown, and recovered parachutes used on Apollo 10, 12,  
and 13) were loaded i n  tension t o  132 000 p s i  as calculated f o r  the  minor 
diameter of the  threads. No fa i lu res  occurred i n  the  accumulated 150 
hours of sir exposure t e s t  time on each specimen. 
Two other t e s t s  were performed t o  provide base-ltne data  on stud 
fa i lu res .  An Apollo 10 stud w a s  purposely charged 1~3th hydrogen and 
placed under a net  sect ion s t r e s s  load of 132 000 p s i .  The stud f a i l e d  
i n  30 minutes and thus validated the  hydrogen embrittlement screening 
t e s t .  The second t e s t  used l o t  R l inks  t h a t  had or ig inal ly  been re jec ted  
due t o  hydrogen e ~ b r i t t l e m e n t .  These l inks  were t e s t e d  t o  132 000 ps i  
fo r  200 hours without f a i lu re ,  indicat ing tha t  the  hydrogen embrittle- 
ment character is t ics  had decayed. 
The resu l t s  of metallurgical examinations and these t e s t s  support 
the  following conclusions: 
1. Physical evidence f o r  hydrogen-inducea delayed fa i lu res  of l o t  
U and l o t  T studs does not now ex i s t  bu t ,  due t o  the  long elapsed time 
since plat ing,  hydrogen-induced f a i l u r e  cannot be ruled r u t .  
2. Sea water does not induce cracks a t  the  times and nominal stress 
levels  expected, although general rus t ing of exposed s t e e l  occurs rapidly.  
Stress corrosion cracks can be induced by exposure t o  salt water a t  
s t r e s s  levels  higher than those expected f o r  a nomtnal 60 i n d b  torque. 
3. For t h e  f a i l e d  studs,  the  flaws probably occurred a f t e r  the  
p la t ing  operation. 
Studs exposed t o  hypergolic propellants are  t o  be t e s ted  i n  order 
t o  astem,ine i f  propellant exposure could have caused the  observed flaws. 
Pu l l  t e s t s :  k se r i es  of connector l ink  p u l l  t e s t s  w e r e  conducted. 
Apollo l ink  which had been preloade'd (nuts torqued) f o r  more than 2 
years with no salt water contact was p u l l  t e s t e d  t o  destruction (12 700 
pounds ) t o  provide a strength reference. Two special  high-strength studs 
were fabricated t o  allow p u l l  t e s t i n g  of t h e  l i n k  end pla tes .  However, 
the  high-strength studs f a i l e d  a t  a load of 12 850 pounds, and t h e  end 
p 1 a . t ~ ~  remained i n t a c t ,  verifying t h a t  the  Apollo l i n k  studs are  t h e  
weakest s t ruc tu ra l  members. 
The recovered Apollo 15 connector l ink  with the  separated stud w a s  
f i t t e d  with a r i s e r  and suspension l i n e s  and p u l l  t e s t e d  t o  evaluate i t s  
capabil i ty i n  the  three-nut configuration. The l i n k  had f a i l e d  i n  the  
stud thread and t h e  stud had a shoulder remaining i n  t h e  end p l a t e  which 
could carry load. This l i n k  w a s  successfully subjected t o  two complete 
f l i g h t  load cycles, then t h e  load was increased t o  5000 pounds (which cor r  
responds t o  canopy ultimate strength) and successfully held f o r  2 minutes. 
These t e s t s  demonstrated t h a t  t h e  stud f a i l u r e  could have occurred p r i o r  
t o  parachute deployment. A f i n a l  test was made with one end p l a t e  removed, 
simulating a t e n s i l e  f a i l u r e  of one stud a t  t h e  shoulder, o r  tvo  sheared 
studs. This l i n k  f a i l e d  a t  1300 pounds, a value below the  opening loads 
but higher than t h e  steady-state loads. 
Reli ,abil i tg and qual i ty  assurance records review.- A review was made 
of the  manufacturing and inspection his tory  records of t h e  parachute l i a k  
assembly manufactured by Northrop Ventura.. Records were researched a t  
North American Rockwell, Downey , California; Metal Surfaces, Inc . , B e l l  
Gardens, California; and Northrop Ventura, Thousand Oaks, California. 
The records show t h a t  t h e  pa r t s  for  Apollo 15 ( l o t  Q p la tes ,  and 
l o t  u studs)  and   pol lo 16 ( l o t  w p la tes  and studs 1 were properly pro- 
cessed i n  accordance with t h e  l a t e s t  revision of t h e  Northrop p la t ing  
specif icat ion.  
One s igni f icant  item disclosed by the  review w a s  tha t  l o t  R studs 
which should have been scrapped were accepted and i n s t a l l e d  i n  f l i g h t  par- 
achutes. Lot R studs were flown i n  one parachute on Apollo 1 4 ,  and were 
i n s t a l l e d  i n  a parachute t o  be used f o r  future f l i g h t .  
Parachute tow t e s t s  .- A se r i es  of ground tow t e s t s  was conducted t o  
evaluate the  character is t ics  of the  in f l a ted  parachute and r i s e r  load re- 
sponse resul t ing  from severing one, two, and th ree  r i s e r  legs of a fully 
in f l a ted  main parachute. In f l a t ion  w a s  obtained by towing t h e  parachute 
in to  the  wind. When the  canopy was f u l l y  in f l a ted  and s t ab le ,  selected 
r i s e r s  were pyrotechnically severed. Individual r i s e r  leg loads, t o t a l  
r i s e r  load, and photographic? documentation were obtained. 
When one of t h e  s i x  r i s e r  legs was severed, t h e  canopy remained f u l l y  
in f l a ted  and, i n  approximately 2 seconds, exhibited f u l l  r i s e r  load. When 
two adjacent r i s e r  legs were severed, t h e  canopy collapsed but did continue 
t o  provide a drag force of approximately one-third the f u l l y  in f l a ted  value. 
Three r i s e r s  were severed i n  t h e  t h i r d  t e s t ;  two were adjacent and the  t h i r d  
was separated from them by a good r i s e r  leg. When t h e  r i s e r s  were severed, 
the  canopy collapsed, with t h e  portion opposite the  severed r i s e r s  holding 
air f o r  several seconds. The load h i s to r i es  f o r  each of t h e  three  t e s t s  
are shown i n  f igure 13. The i n i t i a l  load drop for  the  one-, two-, and 
three-riser  t e s t  was 600, 1700, and 2300 l b ,  respectively. 
These t e s t s  indicated t h a t  the  Apollo main parachute w i l l  remain 
fu l ly  in f l a ted  and provide normal drag with one of i t s  s i x  r i s e r  legs sev- 
ered. When two o r  more adjacent r i s e r  legs are  severed, t h e  canopy w i l l  
collapse, and lose  a t  l e a s t  two-thirds of i t s  load-carrying capabil i ty.  
Conclusions from connector l i n k  investigations .- The f a i l e d  l i n k  on 
the  recovered parachute implies the  poss ib i l i ty  of a similar  occurrence 
on the  f a i l e d  parachute. However, the  parachute tow t e s t s  indica te  t h a t  
a s ingle l ink  f a i l u r e  would not have caused t h e  load change (approximately 
1300 pounds) determined from t h e  spacecraft data. Although t h e  l i n k  f a i l -  
ure i s  not believed t o  have caused t h e  parachute anomaly, a complete recc 
ords review and a materials t e s t  program were performed t o  determine t h e  
cause of the  flaws. The records show t h a t  the  Apollo 15 l o t  l inks  were 
processed i n  accordance with all requirements. The l i n k  t e s t s  shawed 
tha t  the  broken l ink  can c82.ry the  f l i g h t  loads (in t h e  case of Apollo 15 
type break). The available evidence cannot ru le  out e i t h e r  hydrogen em- 
b r i t  tlement o r  salt -water-induced s t r e s s  corrosion a t  higher-than-expected 
s t r e s s  levels  as the  possible cause of t h e  fa i lu re .  I n  f a c t ,  the  cause 
of the  flaw i s  not known. 
Command Module Reaction Control System 
The command module reaction control system was considered as a possi- 
b le  cause of the  anomaly f o r  t h e  following reasons: 
a. The propellant depletion f i r i n g  terminated 3.5 seconds before the  
spacecraft ra tes  gave evidence of a major disturbance. The excess f u e l  
expulsion which followed the  depletion f i r i n g  was s t i l l  i n  progress a t  the  
time of fa i lure  
b. The damaged parachute held a posi t ion generally above the  minus 
Y r o l l  engines while the  fue l  expulsion was i n  progress. 
i I U '  - * 
3 risers severed 
2 adjacent 
I 
$ ' --I I I I -------+,;
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
Time, sec 
Figure 13 .- Parachute tow test loads. 
I 
. i 
I 
I I ! ! . . 1 riser severed : 
! 
1 .  
I I a 
! 
I 
I 
. 
WIL.--'.~* 
! 
c. Burning f u e l  can cause damage t o  the  r i s e r s ,  suspension l i n e s ,  
o r  parachute canopy. 
d. Evidence of melting was found on the  Dacron protec t ive  covering 
of the  fabr ic  r i s e r  and t h e  connector l inks  on the  recovered parachute 
assembly. 
Slstem Operation.- Both command module react ion control  systems were 
act ivated normally a t  294: 07 :14. Both systems were used during entry as 
opposed t o  previous missions where one system w a s  turned off  p r i o r  t o  entry.  
System performance during t h e  control led port ion of entry was nominal as 
ve r i f i ed  by pressure and temperature da ta  and from spacecraft r a t e s  pro- 
duced by commanded engine f i r ings .  
The command module react ion control  system control  f i r i n g s  were t e r -  
minated normally a t  295 : 06 : 44 when the  systems were e l e c t r i c a l l y  disabled. 
A t  t h i s  point i n  the  mission, t h e  engines had been f i r e d  approximately 
680 times and the  t o t a l  f i r i n g  time was about 160 seconds. The propellant 
usage had been 20 pounds of f u e l  and 36 pounds of oxidizer ,  divided equally 
between the  two systems. Propellant consumption w a s  established by pres- 
sure,  temperature, and volume calculat ions and confirmed by t h e  summation 
of the  engine f i r i n g  times. Usable propellant  r emix ing  a t  295:06:44, 
p r i o r  t o  the  start of t h e  depletion f i r i n g ,  was 30 pounds of f u e l  and 53 
pounds of oxidizer i n  each system f o r  a t o t a l  of 60 p ~ u n d s  of fue l  and 
106 pounds of oxidizer.  Total  propellant remaining, including the  trapped 
propellants ,  was 69 pounds of fue l  and 120 pounds of oxidizer.  
The command module react ion control  system depletion f i r i n g  w a s  man- 
ual ly  i n i t i a t e d  a t  295 :08:22. During t h i s  f i r i n g ,  the  two systems were 
interconnected by opening squib valves between the  helium manifolds, t h e  
f u e l  manifolds, and the  oxidizer  manifolds .. The engine valves on al l  but  
the  two plus p i t ch  engines were a lso  opened using t h e  d i rec t  c o i l s .  Sys- 
tem pressures indicated t h a t  t h e  depletion f i r i n g  was normal with oxidizer  
depletion a t  295 :09 : lo .  Fuel depletion followed 4.7 seconds l a t e r .  These 
times were. confirmed by calculat ions using the  propellant remaining p r i o r  
t o  the  f i r i n g ,  and a mixture r a t i o  and propellant  flow r a t e  commensurate 
with steady-state f i r i n g  from 10 engines. Between the  time of oxidizer  de- 
plet ion and f u e l  depletion, about 7 pounds of r a w  f u e l  were being expelled. 
The command module react ion control  system l i n e  purge operation w a s  
manually ir:.itiated a t  295 : 09 : 22. This operation opened four squib valves 
tha t  enabled the  helium gas t o  bypass the  propellant tttnks and purge the  
res idual  o r  trapped propellants from the  systiem manifold l i n e s .  Regulated 
helium pressure and helium source pressure data ve r i f i ed  a normal purge 
operation. A t  295:09:25 and 295:09:28, colored clouds were seen coming 
from the  spacecraft.  This is  normal and i s  caused by t h e  expulsion of 
unburned oxidizer through the  engines by the  purge operation. Unburned 
fue l  is  also often seen about t h i s  time i n  the  form of a white cloud. 
Post f l ight  t e s t i n g  of t h e  command module reaction control  syatam 
showed it t o  be i n  normal working order. Testing included leak checks 
of the propellant tank bladders, engine valve leak t e s t s ,  engine valve 
signature t races  t o  v e r i w  proper opening character is t ics ,  and electronic 
t e s t s  t o  ver i fy  the  e l e c t r i c a l  wiring and terminal board connections. 
Command module reaction control system f u e l  expulsion tea ts . -  Two 
t e s t s  were performed t o  invest igate t h e  potent ia l  e f fec t s  of a raw fue l  
expulsion on the  parachutes: 
The first t e s t  was a f e a s i b i l i t y  demonstration t o  determine if f'uel 
sprayed on the  parachute r i s e r s  and suspension l i n e s  would burn, assuming 
tha t  there  could be an igni t ion  source. A simple nozzle w a s  used t o  spray 
raw fue l  in to  a 30 f t / s e c  a i r  stream and onto a sample of t h e  riser and 
suspension l ines ,  par t  of which was surrounded by a Dacron bootie. Hot- 
wire igni t ion  sources were imbedded i n  t h e  bootie and r i s e r  t o  s i m ~ d a t e  
an i n f l i g h t  igni t ion  source. These t e s t s  demonstrated t h s t  , above cei-tain 
threshold fue l  concentration levels ,  the fue l  on t h e  booties would burn i n  
a wick-like manner. This resulted i n  riser and suspension l i n e  fa i lu res  
due t o  melting of t h e  nylon material.  
The second t e s t  consisted of f i r i n g  a command nioilule reaction control  
system engine followed by fue l  cold flow (simulated f'uel expulsion). It 
was performed t o  inves t igate  the  e f fec t s  of cold flowing raw f u e l  through 
a hot engine. For these  t e s t s ,  a reection control  system engine and a 
minus-pitch nozzle extension were mounted horizontal ly i n  an ambient t e s t  
c e l l .  There was no attempt t o  simulate the  re la t ive  a;Lr veloci ty  surround- 
ing a descending command module. T;le t e s t  f i r i n g s  consisted of a s e r i e s  
of hot f i r ings  of 10 t o  45 seconds i n  duration, each followed by a 5~second 
fuel  cold flow (about 0.6 pound of fue l ) .  I n  every case, the  raw fuel  ex- 
pulsion sequence produced burning outside of t h e  engine. Burning fuel  
vapor, burning fuel  droplets ,  and some unburned fue l  were observed during 
these t e s t s .  The flame f ron t  existed up t o  8 f e e t  from the  engine e x i t  
plane and unburned f u e l  was sprayed up t o  1 0 ' f e e t  from the  engine and then 
igni ted  by burning droplets.  
Conclusions from reaction control. system investigations.- A s  a r e su l t  
of these t e s t s ,  t h e  hazard of a raw ~ ' u e l  expulsion was demonstrated. I n  
addition, s ince the  f a i l e d  parachute was positioned over .the r o l l  engines 
for  the  time period jus t  p r io r  t o  t h e  anomaly, the  e f fec t s  noted i n  the  
second t e s t  were, most l ike ly ,  t h e  cause of t h e  Apollo 15 parachute fa i lu re .  
CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the  data and resu l t s  of the  specia l  t e s t s  lead t o  the  
following conclusions: 
a.  The most probable cause of the  anomaly was t h e  burning of raw 
fuel  (monomethyl hydrazine) being expelled during t he  l a t t e r  portion of 
t h e  depletion f i r i ng  and t h i s  resulted i n  exceeding t he  parachute-riser 
and suspension-line temperature l imi ts .  
b. The forward heat shield passed extremely close t o  t he  command 
module during the  descent phase; however, a t  the  time of t he  anomaly, 
t he  heat shield was 700 fee t  below t h e  command module. 
c. Impact of the  forward heat shield on the  parachute r i s e r s ,  sus- 
pension l ines ,  canopy, or spacecraft w i l l  not cause catastrophic damage. 
d. The f a i l u r e  of a single connector l ink  w i l l  not cause a main 
parachute t o  f a i l .  
e. The flaw observed i n  t he  recovered parachute connector l i nk  prob- 
ably occurred a f t e r  t he  plating operation, and could be due e i ther  t o  salt- 
water-induced s t ress  corrosion or  hydrogen embrittlement . 
CORRECTIVE ACTION 
Corrective actions for t he  reaction control syst ein include landing 
with the  propellants onboard fo r  a normal landing and biasing t h e  pro- 
pellant  load t o  provide a s l ight  excess of oxidizer. Thus, fo r  t h e  low- 
a l t i t ude  abort land landing case, burning t he  propellants while on t he  
parachutes w i l l  suk;ect t he  parachutes t o  some acceptable oxidizer damage 
but w i l l  eliminate t he  dangerous burning fue l  condition. In  addition, 
t he  time delay which inhibits  t h e  rapid propellant dump i s  being changed 
from 42 t o  61 seconds. This w i l l  provide more assurance tha t  t he  propel- 
l an t  w i l l  not have t o  be burned through the  reaction control system en- 
gines i n  t h e  event of a land landing. 
The design of the  suspension l i n e  connector l inks  has been modified. 
t o  preclude t h e  development of high s t ress  levels  due t o  torque leve l s  
and t o  reduce t h e  uncertainty of loads due t o  tolerance buildup. The l ink  
material has been changed t o  Inconel 718 t o  e l in inate  t he  requirement for  
plat ing and, therefore, the  poss ibi l i ty  of hydrogen embrittlement. I n  
addition, t he  l i nk  stud threads are  rol led rather than machined t o  i q r o v e  
metallurgical properties of the  material,  and the  studs are subjected t o  
a proof t e s t  designed t o  screen flaws which could subsequently propagate 
under s d t  water exposure. 
